Abstract-Security is one major issue with RFID technology.
A RFID tag is an electronic device that holds identification data. Typically, the RFID tag is attached to items and contains -a serial number, which is used to uniquely identify them. RFID technology uses radio waves to automatically identify items which have RFID tags attached to it.
This technology was initially developed with the aim to
The paper is organized as follows. In Sectioon2, we survey manage and track items in supply chain and logistics, but the existing literature on RFID security. In Section 3, we nowadays it is used in many other areas e.g. medical formalize the problem description. In Section 4, we propose applications, manufacturing, retail, livestock tracking and the data recovery solution. In Section 5, we provide a tracking exact timing in sports events. As pointed out by discussion and conclude the paper in Section 6. RFIDExchange "RFID applications are limited only by imagination" [22] . It can be used any where and every where if II. LITERATURE REVIEW possible.
RFID technology is composed of three main components;
While researchers are just starting to address security firstly, a RFID tag, which contains the identification number, questions, privacy advocates and legislators have for some secondly, a RFID Reader, which activates the tag to broadcast time been attempting to address the privacy issues. A lot of its identification number and finally, a RFID Middleware, work has been done to address the privacy issues in RFID which integrates the information from the reader to the deployment; however literature addressing the security issues backend database systems [16, 17] . This is shown in Fig. 1 .
is quite limited. The main aim of this section is to discuss the 1-4244-0726-5/06/$20.OO '2006 IEEE security issues in RFID systems and survey the relevant A. Anonymity literature that is proposed to address the same.
RFID technology shows the characteristics that can invade Wong and Raphael (2006) classify attacks on RFID systems personal privacy; hence anonymity is highly desired if this into two categories -passive attacks and active attacks. technology would be deployed in mass scale. A lot of work has Passive attackers are those who eavesdrop on the already been conducted in this area and several proposals are communications channel, but do not affect or interfere with the put forward to address the issue of privacy [6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 , communication in any way [27] We now discuss the current literature which addresses some B Confidentiality of the security issues highlighted in the Fig. 2 . Most of the Several approaches to access control are proposed in the proposed solutions discussed here address the first four security properties i.e. confidentiality, availability, authenticity and anonymity. We begin the discussion with solutions to detail in this section. manage anonymity.
Juels, Rivest and Szydlo (2003), discuss a hash based Access Control Protocol [13] . Here the tag is first in a locked state. When the tag moves to the unlocked state the reader can access the tags details. In order to change the state the tag first transmits Meta ID' which is the hash value of a key. An collaborating in the virtual environment. In distributed logistics authorized reader looks up the corresponding key in a backend networks and extended enterprises, collaborating peers could system and sends it to the tag. The tag verifies the key by accuse each other for being vulnerable to security attacks hashing it, returns the clear text ID, and remains only for a which may reduce their trustworthiness, and eventually such a short time in an 'unlocked' state which provides time for collaborative environment would not sustain any longer. For reader authentication and offers a modest level of access example, if the data on the RFID tag representing the 'nature security.
of good' were changed from 'Mangoes' to 'Oranges' wrong C Authenticity goods would be shipped to wrong customers, which would in
The literature on the authentication of the RFID tag is also turn affect the reputation of the logistics provider. And the only way to achieve this is by modifying the EM or Data tampering and data recovery are the two major security the OC component of the RFID data structure'. For example, concerns in RFID deployment. Any solution that can address OC is used to uniquely identify one product; if product A these issues i.e. to detect that data tampering has happened and (Orange) has cheaper transportation cost compared to product to provide a mechanism to recover the tampered data would be B (Mango), the attacker might attempt to change OC of very significant, whenever large and complex RFID based product B, to gain an economic benefit. However if the solutions require security and authenticity.
attacker changes the serial number (SN), which is used to One good example would be e-logistics and e-Warehouse identify one item of a specific product, it cannot gain any where consortia of small to medium enterprises (SME) around economic benefit, because SN does not represent a product, but the world work together to share businesses, customers, just a unique identifier for a item belonging to one product. resources and goods tracking to provide just-in-time customer services. Such a virtual collaborative environment survives on the assumption of reliable and authentic information.
1 RFID data structure is composed of four partitions -Header, EPC Automatic identification technology provided by RFID heavily Manager (EM), Object Class (OC) and Serial Number (SN). EM uniquely relies on the authenticity of the information. If this information identifies a manufacturer globally, OC identifies one product manufactured by one manufacturer i.e. EM and SN identifies one unique item belonging to one is tampered, it can destroy the reputation of the businesses product. A detailed explanation can be found here [19, 20, 21 4) original values by resorting to the embedded pattern in the SN 5. The algorithm is designed as a component; hence, it can be partition. The detailed algorithm is explained later.
easily plugged into any existing middleware application.
The functionality for embedding of the secret pattern is (Req. 5) assumed to be present in the RFID reader which initially writes
We now discuss the theoretical foundation for ResTamp. the tags, whereas the extraction algorithm is assumed to be available as a component which can be plugged in the RFID V. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR PROPOSED DATA middleware applications. The ResTamp solution would be a RECOVERY SCHEME -RESTAMP The proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4, 5 (Sd) redundant space to embed the secret pattern. Meanwhile, the length of this partition is 36 bits (in EPC96) which offers
Step 1: Secret Pattern Generation enough room to accommodate the secret pattern. Thus, this The secret pattern is generated as shown in Fig. 4 . One becomes the most appropriate candidate for embedding the instance of EM and OC, which is uniform across a given watermark, and hence, we decided to choose this partition for product category, is encoded using error correction codes embedding. We now discuss the embedding and extraction (ECC) to offer additional level of security and also helps in algorithm in detail. recovery of tampered data. EM introduces an extra 'b' bits along with 28bits and OC introduces another 'a' bits along C SecretPatterEmbedding with 24bits. Error location for embedding. We now discuss how we select the appropriate location for embedding the secret pattern.
Step 1: Load the Secret Pattern
B. Selecting the Embedding Location
In the first step, the RFID reader loads the secret pattern in Previously, we mentioned that the secret pattern (Si) should its memory. The secret pattern Sf is can be generated by the be embedded in the serial number partition of the RFID tag. In RFID reader or by the RFID middleware. We assume that this section, we give the reason for this selection.
the reader has the functionality to generate this. The basic principle of steganography (or information hiding)
Step Igr,err~ed n grey~acKgroun~-) Proceed to the next step Based on the extracted bits, recover the secret bits using ECC coding.
Step As long as the serial number has not been tampered with, the multiple REID tags. Here we assume that the length of the prpsdtcnqecneatyrcvrtetmee aa secet aternis66 its 5 (2±2) bts reinptsto GG which in this case is the EM and 0G. But if the SN is which results in 66 ((28±a) ± (14±b)) bits output, where a ± b tampered, to match the SN of another product (with lower transport cost), we recommend that the manufacturer should follow a standard whereby the first n bits from the SN would [11] Ari Juels. RFID security and privacy: A research survey. 
